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 i 
Abstract 
New and useful ideas and knowledge, commonly denoted innovations after coming into use, 
are of decisive importance for economic growth and welfare. To promote the generation and 
diffusion of innovations, most, if not all, industrialized and industrializing societies rely on 
some form of an intellectual property rights (IPRs) system. As technological diversification, 
technological convergence, and open innovation become increasingly important, proper 
management of and strategies for IPRs and intellectual property (IP) becomes ever more 
central for the competitiveness of firms and nations. The general purpose of this thesis it to 
explore and explain the causes and consequences of IP strategies and policies at firm, 
national, and international levels in different industrial contexts with different types and 
degrees of openness in innovation. With focus on technological innovations and technology-
related IP, various methods are employed to fulfill the purpose.  
The results show that, due to IP policy developments at national and international level, large 
firms have increasingly developed various IP strategies, especially patent strategies, to 
appropriate returns from innovations. As an example, large firms were found to in a first step 
increase their patenting (in terms of quantity), and in a second step focus more on selective 
and quality-oriented patenting in which the IP-related work is also internationalized. This 
internationalization of IP heavily impacts the patent offices and IP policies, especially in 
small countries where the national patenting tend to decrease as a result. Small firms on the 
other hand cannot gain the same benefits as large firms from an IPR system, especially from 
the patent system as currently designed, since they do not have enough resources for 
monitoring and enforcing their rights, which in turn limits the protective function of patents. 
Instead, small firms use patents to attract customers and investors. Patents then provide a 
governance mechanism for early stage financing of innovations.  
A new measure based on statistics at the national level indicates that the preferred markets for 
patenting from firms and inventors in various countries become increasingly similar. In 
addition, there is a convergence of national legal IPR systems around the world. Developing 
and industrializing nations in this convergence process typically switch from a weak to a 
strong IP regime in their national innovation systems, at a point in time when the mainly 
innovative benefits of a strong regime outweigh the mainly imitative benefits of a weak 
regime for the nation and its firms. A similar switch from a weak to a strong IP regime can be 
seen in various innovation systems, e.g. in mobile telecommunications. The openness of 
innovation in such a corporate innovation system is closely related to the IP strategies of the 
involved firms, and the results show that the openness in a system is directly and strongly 
affected by changes in the IP strategies of its firms. 
The thesis shows the importance of the interaction between IP strategies of large and small 
firms, between different large and small nations’ IP policies, and between IP strategies of 
firms and IP policies of nations. Such interactions are essential to consider for future research, 
as are the roles of IPRs and IP management in innovation systems with various degrees of 
openness. 
Keywords: Intellectual property; intellectual property right; patent; technology; innovation; 
open innovation; economics; management; appropriation; strategy; policy 
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1 Introduction 
Economic growth and welfare developments are driven by new and useful knowledge. More 
specifically, developments in technical knowledge (technology) and innovations have been 
shown to largely impact economic developments and growth. As the interest for the relation 
between innovations and growth at both firm and national levels has increased, the interest for 
issues related to intellectual property (IP) and intellectual property rights (IPRs), including 
patents, has consequently grown. Nations use IPR systems for incentivizing the generation 
and diffusion of new knowledge, and firms and other actors then use such systems to promote 
their own interests and increase their competitiveness. IP strategies are thus central for 
competitiveness at many levels. 
Legal and political changes in the US in the 1980s, which essentially strengthened the IP 
regime, led to what is sometimes called a ‘pro-IP era’ or a ‘pro-patent era’ (Granstrand, 
1999). As a result, US patenting increased steeply. That increase spurred the interest for IP 
issues among practitioners and scholars, and a number of studies investigated the increase in 
patenting (see e.g. Kortum and Lerner, 1998; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). More recent trends 
show a rapid increase of patenting in developing countries, especially in China, as studied by 
Hu and Jefferson (2009) and Hu (2010). 
Related developments are the increasing importance of technological convergence 
(Rosenberg, 1963; Jantsch, 1967), technological diversification (Kodama, 1986; Granstrand 
and Sjölander, 1990; Granstrand et al., 1997), and various forms of open innovation 
(Granstrand and Sjölander, 1990; Chesbrough, 2003, 2006; Chesbrough et al., 2006). Such 
trends are related (see e.g. Granstrand et al., 1997), and they lead to an increased need for 
proper management and strategies of IPRs and IP. 
This thesis will deal with strategies related to IP and IPRs at the firm, national, and 
international levels, and the thesis and its four appended papers take on a wide scope of the 
concept of IP strategies. Paper I reviews the literature related to patent propensity, 
appropriation strategies and motives for patenting, and presents empirical results on 
entrepreneurial SMEs. Paper II investigates the causes and consequences of increases and 
decreases in patenting in Sweden and Swedish firms. Paper III studies global IP-related 
developments, and especially whether there is a global convergence. Paper IV, finally, relates 
IP strategies to the dynamics of openness in innovation systems. 
This cover paper is outlined as follows. The introductory chapter is followed by a problem 
description and the purpose in chapter 2. Previous research and the frame of reference are 
discussed in chapter 3. Based on previous research, the specific research questions are 
outlined in chapter 4, before the methodology is motivated and described in chapter 5. The 
methodology is followed by summaries of the appended papers in chapter 6. The answers to 
the research questions are presented in chapter 7, leading to conclusions and suggestions for 
future research in chapter 8. 
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2 Problem and purpose 
Intellectual property used to be patents only. Now everyone begins to realize that 
intellectual property is not only patents, it is actually whole sets of architectures or 
skill-sets of a technology, or even business models. That moves it into the strategy room 
with questions like: If we have this intellectual property or these assets, how can we 
best make use of them? (Leif Johansson, CEO of Volvo Group) 1 
2.1 Background 
As described in the introduction, current business trends have led to an increased interest for, 
focus on and importance of IP and IPRs and proper management of these. In the early 1980s, 
legal changes in the US, including the creation of the US Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit 
(CAFC) and the strengthening of enforcement of patent rights, led to what is sometimes 
referred to an explosion in patenting in the US (see e.g. Hall, 2005) and the ‘pro-patent era’ 
(Granstrand, 1999). Since then, US patenting has more than tripled (as seen in Figure 2.2 in 
section 2.3) and large firms have increased their patenting a lot, exemplified by the top ten 
patentees2 in Table 2.1. As globalization is increasing, this change has impacted firms also 
outside the US, and Asian firms in fact hold a large share of granted US patents. The 
worldwide patenting has also increased during the same period, albeit with a slightly lower 
pace, see Figure 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Top ten patentees in terms of granted US utility patents in 1987, 2000 and 2010 
 1987 No.  2000 No.  2010 No.
1 Canon 847 1 IBM 2886 1 IBM 5866
2 Hitachi 845 2 NEC 2021 2 Samsung 4518
3 Toshiba 823 3 Canon 1890 3 Microsoft 3086
4 General Electric 779 4 Samsung 1441 4 Canon 2551
5 US Philips 687 5 Lucent 1411 5 Panasonic 2443
6 Westinghouse 652 6 Sony 1385 6 Toshiba 2212
7 IBM 591 7 Micron Technology 1304 7 Sony 2130
8 Siemens 539 8 Toshiba 1232 8 Intel 1652
9 Mitsubishi Electric 518 9 Motorola 1196 9 LG Electronics 1488
10 RCA 504 10 Fujitsu 1147 10 HP 1480
 Total: 6785  Total: 15913  Total: 27426
Source: Statistics from USPTO for year 2000 and 2010, and Granstrand (1999) for year 1987 
 
 
                                                 
 
1 This statement was made by the CEO of Volvo Group, Leif Johansson, in a project interview at Volvo Group’s 
headquarters in Gothenburg, 2009-09-16. 
2 The concept ‘patentee’ denotes the patent applicant, while ‘patentor’ is the person or actor granting the patent. 
Similarly ‘licensee’ denotes a license buyer, while the ‘licensor’ is the license seller. 
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Source: Statistics from WIPO 
Figure 2.1 Patent applications worldwide per year, 1985-2007 
 
This growth in patenting indicates an increasing importance of IP and increasing relative 
values of intellectual capital (IC). Granstrand (1999) elaborates upon the notion of intellectual 
capitalism, a form of capitalism where the traditional dependence upon fixed assets is 
increasingly replaced with dependence upon intellectual and intangible assets, such as 
knowledge, competence, patents, trademarks, etc. A number of measures have been used by 
various scholars to point at the increasing relative value of intellectual capital, although few of 
them actually provide any clear evidence if scrutinized.3 However, the fact that the share of 
                                                 
 
3 A number of measures of increasing importance of IP and intellectual capitalism that have been used can be 
questioned. First, looking at increased patenting, the worldwide increase to a large extent stems from increases in 
patenting in the United States and various countries in Asia, e.g. Japan, Korea, India and China, see e.g. Figure 
2.2. Since the rise in Asia might be due to general catching-up effects (see e.g. Abramovitz, 1986) this does not 
provide proof of increasing intellectual capitalism. Additionally, the industrialization of the world has increased 
during the same period, which affects the statistics of patent applications. Industrialization in itself is of course 
related to intellectual capitalism, however.  
Second, the value of trademarks is sometimes used as a measure. The sum of the values of the eight most highly 
valued trademarks in 1992 was 132.6 BUSD (see Granstrand, 1999), while the sum of the values of the eight 
most highly valued trademarks in 2009 (which is another set of trademarks) was 363.8 BUSD (see Interbrand, 
2009). This corresponds to an increase in trademark values of 174% from 1992 to 2009 in nominal terms. Since 
the most highly valued trademarks are mainly owned by US companies, the value growth can be compared to the 
increase in GDP for the US from 1992 to 2007 which was 229% in nominal terms (based on OECD Statistics, 
2009). Hence, the growth in trademark values has been lower than the growth of GDP in the US. At the same 
time, comparing growth in trademark values with GDP growth as an indication of intellectual capitalism is 
misleading, since much of the GDP growth might be driven by intellectual capital and knowledge and this 
measure therefore might underestimate intellectual capitalism. Nevertheless, the fact that the GDP of the US 
grows faster than the top values of trademarks could, if anything, be seen as an indicator of decreased intellectual 
capitalism.  
Third, some scholars compare market values of companies with low numbers of employees (e.g. Google) with 
market values of companies with high numbers of employees (e.g. Ford) to show that the relative value of 
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people’s lives spent on education and learning increases and that the intensity of knowledge 
and information in products and services rises still indicate that society is becoming 
increasingly knowledge-based (Granstrand, 1999). Knowledge in general is then of increasing 
importance for competitiveness of countries, companies, individuals, etc. More specifically, 
technical knowledge (technology) and technological developments are major factors behind 
economic developments (Schumpeter, 1942; Solow, 1956, 1957; Rosenberg, 1982; Rosenberg 
and Birdzell, 1986; Scherer, 1999; Baumol, 2002). Considering the role of IP and IPRs in 
incentivizing and diffusing technology, innovation and knowledge investments on country 
level and in corporate and technology management on firm level, it is clear that IP strategies 
are of pivotal importance for the competitiveness of countries as well as firms. 
2.2 Rationale of an IPR and patent system 
As we have seen, information is a commodity with peculiar attributes, particularly 
embarrassing for the achievement of optimal allocation. In the first place, any 
information obtained, say a new method of production, should, from the welfare point of 
view, be available free of charge (apart from the cost of transmitting information). This 
insures optimal utilization of the information but of course provides no incentive for 
investment in research. (Arrow, 1962, pp. 616-617) 
Knowledge has characteristics of a public good, meaning that consumption by one actor does 
not restrict consumption by others (non-rival) and that it is impossible to exclude actors from 
using the good (non-excludable). The non-excludability leads to investors in R&D, 
technology and innovation having problems with appropriating returns from their 
investments. Teece (1986) showed that the profits from innovation are likely to end up with 
holders of complementary assets when imitation is easy, rather than with the inventing actor. 
Arrow (1962) and Mansfield et al. (1977) showed theoretically and empirically, respectively, 
that underinvestment in R&D and innovation occurs due to this market failure. Considering 
the importance that technological developments have for economic developments and growth, 
countries try to incentivize technology and innovation investments by various means. An IPR 
system in general, and a patent system more specifically, is thus constructed to make 
knowledge excludable, at least temporarily, and thereby incentivize generation and diffusion 
of inventions. The role of a patent is thus to temporarily exclude others than the patent holder 
from commercially using the invention. Other IPRs function similarly. The European Patent 
Office (EPO) defines (as of 2011) a patent as “a legal title granting its holder the right to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
intellectual capital in the world has risen since companies with only few employees nowadays can outcompete 
very large organizations in terms of market values. However, such a comparison is also misleading since human 
capital is an important part of intellectual capital, which is further described in section 3.1.2.  
Fourth, the market to book-ratio or Tobin’s q can be used, which indicate the relation between a company’s 
market value and the booked value of its assets. Still, the development of Tobin’s q over time shows no clear 
evidence for increased levels of intellectual capital (despite the all time high around year 2000). Part of the 
reason for this might be more liberal accounting with companies beginning to book more and more intangible 
assets, leading to a decreased Tobin’s q. 
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prevent third parties from commercially exploiting an invention without authorization”. From 
a national policy perspective a patent system therefore has two main functions: 
1. Stimulation of R&D and innovation investments. 
2. Stimulation of knowledge disclosure.4 
An IPR system is one, but not the only, way of incentivizing the generation and diffusion of 
knowledge and inventions (Scotchmer, 2004; Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2010; Granstrand, 
2011a, 2011b), and the patent system has actually received a lot of critique (see e.g. Jaffe and 
Lerner, 2004) for creating too high transaction costs and monopolistic over-pricing leading to 
welfare losses, and some have even suggested to abolish the system. The consequences of 
abandoning the patent system are however impossible to overlook, and the following quote to 
some extent pervades contemporary views of the patent system:  
If one does not know whether a system ‘as a whole’ (in contrast to certain features of it) 
is good or bad, the safest policy conclusion is to ‘muddle through’ – either with it, if one 
has long lived with it, or without it, if one has lived without it. If we did not have a 
patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its 
economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent 
system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, 
to recommend abolishing it. (Machlup, 1958, p. 80) 
Alternatives to a patent system, commonly used in a complementary way, include sales tax 
reductions and subsidies, innovation procurement contracts, R&D tax credits/deductions, 
innovation prizes, and R&D grants/subsidies (cf. Wright, 1983; David, 1993; Granstrand, 
2003; Scotchmer, 2004; Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2010). See Granstrand (2011b) for a more 
thorough elaboration on this subject. 
From a company strategy perspective patents also have two roles, related to the roles on 
policy level above: 
1. Patent rights are important as competitive means for the protection and commercial 
exploitation of new technologies. 
2. Patent information is important as a means for technology and competitor 
intelligence. (Granstrand, 1999, p. 71) 
A company further needs to weigh the benefits from a patent, or any other IPR, against the 
costs. Benefits from a patent typically include possibilities to deter competition and employ 
monopolistic pricing; creation of an identifiable asset that can be used in licensing, financing, 
cooperation, divestment, etc.; creation of an asset that can be activated on the balance sheet; 
enabling intra-firm licensing for cross-country transfer of profits; and creation of incentives to 
invent and measurements of inventive productivity (Granstrand, 1999, 2010). The costs of a 
patent typically relate to the direct costs of writing (including translating), filing and renewing 
                                                 
 
4 A national patent application is typically published 18 months after the filing (priority) date or when the patent 
is granted, whichever comes first. 
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the patent; the costs of monitoring and enforcing the patent; and the drawbacks with the 
related information disclosure. 
2.3 IP strategies 
IP strategies are here differentiated into two main levels; macro (national) level policies and 
micro (firm) level strategies, in accordance with the discussion above.5 At macro level, IP 
policy problems relate to how to manage the IPR system, while IP strategy problems at micro 
level relate to how to manage in the IPR system.  
A number of more or less adjustable parameters are related to an IPR system at macro level, 
and when managing the system the purpose is ultimately to maximize dynamic competition 
while sacrificing as little static competition as possible, and in addition commonly to promote 
domestic firms and inventors (which not necessarily complies with promotion of competition, 
as described below). A national IPR system typically consists of a range of various IPRs, such 
as patent rights, trademark rights and design rights (see also section 3.1.3). Each IPR is 
designed to fulfill one or more purposes. Parameters related to this design include what should 
be protectable6, how long should it be protected, how strong should it be protected, where 
should it be protected, what should be the cost, etc. (for the case of patents, see e.g. Gilbert 
and Shapiro, 1990; Klemperer, 1990; Merges and Nelson, 1990). A general problem is then 
that various IPR systems are typically designed in a ‘one size fits all’ type of way (Thurow, 
1997). This becomes a problem since various actors, intangibles and technologies are 
impacted differently from an IPR system. Technologies with short product life cycles (PLCs) 
and low investment levels, e.g., have the same maximal protection time by a patent as 
technologies with long PLCs and high investment levels. The latter typically needs longer 
market exclusivity to reach positive returns on investments (ROI), whereby also a longer 
protection time would ideally be given, and vice versa.7 Further, small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) have been shown to utilize and benefit from a patent system differently 
than large firms (Granstrand, 1988; Blind et al., 2006; Leiponen and Byma, 2009; 
Rassenfosse, 2011; Paper I).  
A nation’s government has an important role in international competition and for the 
competitiveness of the nation’s firms, and the domestic science and technology policy is 
important in that context (Porter, 1990). The national IPR system is one way of promoting 
nationalistic interests and the management of the system is thus of outmost importance for the 
competitiveness of the nation and its firms. In that context, the competitiveness of the nation’s 
firms relative foreign firms might be more important to promote than creating a well-
functioning system promoting dynamic and static competition within the nation. Strong and 
                                                 
 
5 In this thesis, ‘micro’ relates to the level of the firm, or groups of firms, while ‘macro’ relates to the level of 
nations (i.e. national and international issues). In accordance with this distinction, macro level IP strategies are 
primarily denoted ‘IP policies’. 
6 ‘Patentable subject matter’ in the case of the patent system. 
7 Some flexibility in terms of patent protection time is available in cases of pharmaceutical patents subject to 
many years of trials before marketing due to government regulations.  
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weak IP regimes might therefore be of different use throughout the industrialization process 
of a country (weak IP regimes are then typically useful when catching up while strong IP 
regimes are typically more beneficial when forging ahead, as discussed in Paper III). An IPR 
system therefore typically evolves over time and with the level of industrialization in the 
country. The history of patent-like rights goes back to at least the 14th century (Granstrand, 
1999) although what is often referred to as the first formal patent statute was adopted in 
Venice in 1474 (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2007). China’s first patent law came in 1984 
(Keupp et al., 2010) which can be compared to 1623 in England, 1790 in the US, and 1819 in 
Sweden. As the IPR systems around the world have evolved, they have also started to 
converge, not the least after the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) in 1994, and its enforcement through the World Trade Organization (WTO).8 
Looking at the development of national patent frequency in various countries it is clear that 
the development is very different throughout the world, see Figure 2.2.  While national 
patenting increases in the US and in Asia, it decreases in a number of small industrialized 
European countries, here exemplified with Sweden and some similar small countries in terms 
of industrial structure. In this connection it is important to note that there are a number of 
different routes to take when applying for a patent, as described in Paper II, and statistics must 
therefore be treated with care. Since Swedish patentees can file patent applications not only to 
the Swedish patent and trademark office (PTO), but also to any other national PTO, to the 
European Patent Office (EPO), or in the international PCT system, the decline in Swedish 
national patenting does not necessarily imply a decreased inventive output in Sweden, but 
could also indicate a strategic change among its inventing actors. 
At firm level, IP and IP management is increasingly accepted as strategically important 
matters that deserves and requires top management focus, as exemplified by the quote in the 
beginning of this chapter (see also Granstrand, 1999; Reitzig, 2007). Many companies (and 
products) become increasingly technologically diversified (Kodama, 1986; Pavitt et al., 1989; 
Granstrand and Oskarsson, 1994). As the diversification increases, the costs of R&D increase 
(Granstrand and Oskarsson, 1994). Granstrand (1998) suggests that this partly has to do with 
the coordination and integration work necessary when incorporating multiple technologies in 
the firm. How to appropriate the returns from R&D investments become increasingly 
important as R&D costs increase. The use of various means for appropriation as originally 
studied by Levin et al. (1987), and subsequently by a stream of literature reviewed in section 
3.5 and Paper I, is therefore of interest. Such means include IPRs, but also other means such 
as market lead times, marketing efforts, switching costs, and cost reductions in production.  
 
                                                 
 
8 See also National Resource Council (1993) for a discussion on harmonization and differentiation of IPR 
systems. 
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Source: Statistics from WIPO and national PTOs 
Figure 2.2 National patent applications in selected countries per year, 1985-2008 
 
In addition, as more diverse technologies are included in products and companies, external 
technology acquisition and sourcing and different forms of open innovation becomes 
increasingly important, putting new and increased demands on IP management. Before 
marketing a new technology (in form of a product or a process), all necessary IPRs need to be 
collected, e.g. by using licensing agreements, to ensure freedom to operate. The problem of 
collecting all necessary rights is sometimes called the IP assembly problem (Granstrand, 
2010), and firms without IPRs to cross-license risk to pay large royalties due to vast amounts 
of IPRs spread across stakeholders, a phenomenon referred to as royalty stacking (Lemley and 
Shapiro, 2007; Paper IV). However, industrial developments have pointed not only at the 
problem of assembling IPRs, but also at the problem of disassembling the rights in cases of 
divestments. A recent example is the different consolidation efforts in the automobile 
industry, e.g. GM’s purchase of SAAB Automobile (1990) and Ford’s purchase of Volvo Car 
Corporation (1999), whereby extensive IPRs were collected and merged in joint 
developments. In 2010 (after a global financial crisis) when both GM and Ford were to divest 
SAAB Automobile and Volvo Car Corporation, respectively, one of the main issues to solve 
was how to divide the IPRs (raising interest and involvement from financiers as well as from 
the Swedish government, besides the involved firms). 
Related to assembling and disassembling IPRs are technology acquisition and exploitation 
strategies in general (Granstrand, 1982; Granstrand and Sjölander, 1990). The dichotomy of 
acquisition and exploitation (originating from the works on innovation of Schumpeter, 1934) 
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is then fairly interchangeable with similar dichotomies like exploration and exploitation (see 
e.g. March, 1991), and inbound and outbound innovation (see e.g. Chesbrough and Crowther, 
2006; Dahlander and Gann, 2010). Patents and other IPRs play an important role here as they 
enable technology and knowledge trade (Arora et al., 2004; Granstrand, 2004), e.g. by various 
forms of licensing (Bogers et al., 2011), which would otherwise be hampered due to the 
nature of information which needs to be revealed before traded (Arrow, 1962), often referred 
to as the information paradox. 
Since an IPR system at macro level is designed for promoting generation and diffusion of 
knowledge and ideas at micro level, there are obviously interactions between the strategies 
and actions at macro level and the strategies and actions at micro level, and vice versa. Such 
interactions therefore need to be taken into account when studying IP strategies. IP strategies 
further include managerial, economical, legal, and technological aspects, and IP strategies at 
both macro and micro levels are to large extent part of an international rather than national 
context, which also must be addressed. Hence, when studying IP strategies it is important to 
apply a multinational and interdisciplinary approach (see e.g. Granstrand, 2003).  
2.4 Purpose and scope 
The general purpose of the thesis is to explore and explain the causes and consequences of 
intellectual property (IP) strategies and policies at firm, national, and international levels in 
different industrial contexts with different types and degrees of openness in innovation. 
The thesis focuses mainly on technology-based firms, technology-based competition and 
technology-related strategies. Therefore, the thesis also focuses, albeit in a non-exclusive way, 
on technical inventions. Many types of IPRs can be used to protect technology-based 
competitiveness, including patent rights, trademark rights, and trade secret rights. However, 
most emphasis will be on patents in this thesis, since it is the IPR specifically designed to 
protect and promote technical innovations. 
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3 Frame of reference and previous research 
This chapter starts with defining some of the key concepts for the thesis, leading to a 
discussion on microeconomic theory and open innovation. This is followed by previous 
research on various issues related to IP strategies. The literature review is not exhaustively 
complete, but focuses on the literature streams of most importance for the outline of research 
questions in the following chapter. 
3.1 Key concepts 
There are a number of concepts important to this thesis, mainly related to innovation and 
intellectual property. The main ones are here described, and the descriptions of the concepts 
are grouped into concept families. 
3.1.1 Discoveries, inventions, innovations and imitations 
A first concept family is that of discoveries, ideas, inventions, innovations and imitations. 
Discovery, to start with, is a finding of some pre-existing feature of nature (Granstrand, 
1999). This may e.g. be a law of nature. 
Many definitions of an invention exist. One example is “The first idea, sketch or contrivance 
of a new-to-the-world product, process or system, which may or may not be patented” 
(Freeman et al., 1982, p. 201). However, an invention is most often distinguished from an idea 
in that the invention is the technical application of the idea. An invention differs from a 
discovery in that it is invented by man – hence not existent before being invented. An 
imitation is defined as a close reproduction, copy or duplication of something once perceived 
as an invention.  
An innovation is commonly defined as something new that has come to some sort of use, 
following the works of Schumpeter (1934). Granstrand (1999) defines an innovation as a 
“change in ideas, practices or objects involving some degree of (i) novelty or creation based 
on human ingenuity and (ii) success in application” (p. 58). Notice now that it is mainly the 
second part of this definition that separates the definition of an innovation from the definition 
of an invention. Hence, an invention is turned into an innovation when the invention comes to 
its first use, e.g. by being sold the first time (in the case of a product invention) or by being 
applied in production (in the case of a process invention). Common terms for these two parts 
of the innovation concept are exploration and exploitation (see e.g. March, 1991) and 
acquisition and exploitation (Granstrand, 1982; Granstrand and Sjölander, 1990). Studies have 
shown that, while firms struggle with combining the two activities, the ones who succeed 
increase their sales growth (He and Wong, 2004). Dichotomies of the size of innovations or 
changes typically distinguish between incremental (minor/continuous/evolutionary) and 
radical (major/discontinuous/revolutionary) innovations and changes. The ability in an 
organization to implement both types of change is commonly called ambidexterity (Tushman 
and O’Reilly, 1996), although this concept has also been used as the ability of combining 
exploration and exploitation (see e.g. He and Wong, 2004), which is not necessarily the same 
thing. 
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3.1.2 Intellectual capital, assets, property and property rights9 
The concepts in the family of intellectual property, intellectual capital, intellectual assets and 
intellectual property rights have not yet been fully established and homogenously defined in 
academia and practice, which is described e.g. by Marr et al. (2004). Further, it is difficult to 
account for the values of intellectual property, assets, etc. since there are no exchange value 
related to them (Hall, 1989). Hall (1989) also describes intellectual assets as difficult to 
accumulate and acquire, as capable of simultaneous multiple use and as both inputs or outputs 
in business processes. 
One of the early frameworks of intellectual capital was developed within the Swedish 
insurance company Skandia by Edvinsson (1997) and is illustrated in Figure 3.1. One of the 
drivers behind the development of this model was a perceived need for better valuation of 
companies and accounting measures more linked to the actual market value. The use of these 
new accounting procedures later led to a bubble in Skandia’s stock value which enabled the 
top management of the company to collect large bonuses. This resulted in what was probably 
the largest corporate scandal in Sweden during the first decade of the 21st century, in turn 
staining the concept of intellectual capital to some extent among investors. 
 
 
Source: Edvinsson (1997) 
Figure 3.1 Skandia intellectual capital framework 
 
There are a variety of other frameworks of intellectual capital available, but most frameworks 
have emerged to include three general building blocks (Marr and Adams, 2004), see e.g. 
McConnachie (1997), Roos et al. (1997), Sveiby (1997), Lev (2001), and Bontis (2002). The 
first building block is human capital (by some authors called individual capital, human 
resources or human resource intangibles) which relates to the knowledge, skills, experience, 
etc. related to specific employees. The second block is the structural capital (internal 
structure, organization resources, structural resources or organizational intangibles) and it 
                                                 
 
9 Notice that the word intellectual is commonly exchanged for intangible and immaterial. Intangibles is e.g. often 
used with the same meaning as intellectual or immaterial assets. 
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mainly relates to the organization, management, attitudes, R&D, software, etc. The final 
building block is the relational capital (external structure, relationships resources, customer 
capital or stakeholder relationship) which refers to the relationships with all different 
stakeholders, including customers and suppliers. A general framework for intellectual capital 
and intangible assets, based on the above discussion, is illustrated in Figure 3.2. However, 
intellectual capital is distinguished from intangible assets by having some kind of assignable 
capitalized value. Intangible assets can therefore be seen as a slightly broader concept, since 
the intellectual capital is the part of these assets with “some kind of assignable capitalized 
value”.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Framework for intellectual capital and intangible assets 
 
Moving on to IP, what is the difference between an asset and a property? Encyclopædia 
Britannica defines property as “an object of legal rights, which embraces possessions or 
wealth collectively, frequently with strong connotations of individual ownership. In law the 
term refers to the complex of jural relationships between and among persons with respect to 
things. The things may be tangible, such as land or goods, or intangible, such as stocks and 
bonds, a patent, or a copyright” (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2009). However, the actual 
difference between an intellectual property and an intangible asset is not entirely clear. 
Granstrand (1999, p. 18) makes the following distinctions which will be used in the thesis: 
In common language, the term ‘property’ usually refers to resources (or assets) of some 
sort, physical (tangible, material) or otherwise over which somebody can exercise some 
justified control. In a broad sense, intellectual property (IP) can be taken to mean the 
opposite of physical or material or tangible property, and thus becomes synonymous 
with immaterial property. The term ‘property right’ refers to a right (or bundle of 
rights) that has evolved in society as recognized enforceable claims to some benefits or 
use of the resource. The rights may be transferable and may be treated as property or 
resources in themselves. Thus, property right is a social construct to be distinguished 
from the underlying resource. To emphasize this distinction, the fuller expressions 
‘property rights’ and ‘intellectual property rights’ (IPR) are used. Intellectual property 
rights are typically comprised of patent rights, copyrights, design rights, trademark 
rights, trade secret rights and a few other special property rights as items in 
contemporary law. Intellectual capital in turn essentially comprises all immaterial 
resources that could be considered as assets with some kind of assignable capitalized 
value. 
Following the reasoning above, IPRs will be distinguished from IP. IP will be used as a broad 
concept for intangible assets with ownership assigned to them, whilst IPRs are the legal rights 
protecting the ownership of the asset. 
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3.1.3 Intellectual property rights 
There are a number of (legal, economic, management, engineering, etc.) textbooks describing 
the different IPRs and the legal and practical aspects around them, see e.g. Koktvedgaard and 
Levin (2004), Rockman (2004), and Spence (2007). Rockman (2004) takes his standpoint in 
US law and divides the IPRs into patents, trademarks/service marks, copyrights and trade 
secrets. Patents protect novel, useful and non-obvious inventions. In the US, designs can be 
protected by a design patent (different from the utility patent protecting inventions). 
Copyrights “cover the creative works of authors, composers, software developers, artists and 
the like” (Rockman, 2004, p. 5). Trademarks and service marks protect the “source identity” 
of products and services. Examples of source identities are logos and names. Trade secrets 
protect from misappropriation of valuable secrets that are not generally known. However, a 
trade secret does not protect from others inventing the same thing independently or from 
reverse engineering. Hence, trade secrets are most suitable for secrets that are difficult to 
discover or reverse engineer.10 Notice also that e.g. patents and copyrights expire after a 
certain time11 while there is no legally codified end to trade secret rights. 
Spence (2007) bases his description on the UK situation and divides the IPRs into copyrights, 
patents, trademarks and database rights. The database right protects a collection of 
“independent works, data or other materials which are systematically arranged and 
individually accessible” (Spence, 2007, pp. 11-12). 
Koktvedgaard and Levin (2004), finally, describe IPRs from the Scandinavian legal point of 
view and divide them into copyrights, patents, design rights and trademarks. Hence, trade 
secret rights are not included in this description even though trade secrets are protectable by 
law in Sweden.  
The national differences which can be identified in the descriptions of IPRs above will at this 
point be left without further comments. Notice however that the IPRs in general only offer a 
national protection. If e.g. an invention is patented in Germany it offers only legal protection 
in Germany. This does not give the owner right to prevent others from using the invention in 
e.g. France. Copyrights, in contrast, commonly protect the owner internationally, at least in 
practice (Koktvedgaard and Levin, 2004). 
Worth noticing is that a patent in itself does not give the owner any freedom to use the 
invention commercially, it might in fact be hindered by other patents. Consider a case where a 
basic invention is patented by company A. Company B then improves the basic invention and 
patents this improvement. Then company B needs a license from company A on the basic 
invention before having the right to produce its product (based on both inventions). The patent 
                                                 
 
10 Rockman (2004) also describes mask works for semiconductors as an IPR, but due to its limited importance 
for this thesis it is not further discussed here. Interested readers are referred to the original reference. 
11 The length of a copyright varies in different jurisdictions. In the US and in Sweden, a copyright lasts for 70 
years after the death of the creator of the copyrighted work. A patent typically lasts for 20 years after the filing of 
the application as long as the renewal fees are being paid. See also Greenhalgh and Rogers (2010) for a 
description of the length, breadth and coverage of various intellectual property rights. 
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does only give the owner a right to prevent others from using the patented invention 
commercially (Spence, 2007), not a right for the owner to commercialize it him-/herself. 
Even though no commonly accepted general division into different IPRs can be identified in 
the literature (which is not surprising due to differences in national laws) the following non-
exclusive division will be used here: 
 Copyrights 
 Design rights 
 Patent rights 
 Trademark rights 
 Trade secret rights 
This list of IPRs is by no means exhaustively complete. A number of other rights are also 
available in various jurisdictions, including database rights, mask work rights, plant breeder’s 
rights / plant variety rights, etc. 
3.1.4 Strategy 
Strategy is an essential concept in the thesis. Strategy is originally a military concept referring 
to “the science or art of employing all the military, economic, political, and other resources of 
a country to achieve the objects of war” (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2010). Porter describes 
competitive strategy as “taking offensive or defensive actions to create a defendable position 
in an industry…and thereby yield a superior return on investment for the firm” (1980, p. 34). 
In a resource-based view of the firm a strategy can be described as the resource allocation that 
facilitates a maintained or improved performance (Barney, 1997). 
Mintzberg defines a strategy as “a pattern in a stream of decisions” (Mintzberg, 1978, p. 934), 
and Mintzberg and Waters (1985) emphasize that strategies typically lie on a continuum 
between deliberate and emergent strategies. Deliberate strategies are patterns of decisions 
realized as intended, while emergent strategies are patterns of decisions realized despite or 
without intentions. Hence, Mintzberg and Waters recognize that on one hand are strategies not 
always deliberate, and on the other hand does a deliberate plan not always lead to a pattern of 
decisions according to the plan. 
The strategy concept is commonly used at different levels. Corporate strategy e.g. refers to an 
entire corporation’s strategy while business strategy often refers to a business unit’s strategy 
or a company’s strategy on a specific market. A nation’s strategy, often referred to as policy, 
typically denotes the strategy of a nation or country in improving competitiveness of the 
nation and its firms. Science and technology policies are an important means for governments 
in promoting their country’s competitiveness (Porter, 1990) and IPR policies are an important 
part of such policies. 
3.2 Microeconomic theory 
Although no contributions to microeconomic theory are being made in this thesis, this section 
presents a general background to increase the understanding of various arguments made. In 
addition, Paper IV is to a large extent related to theories of the firm, which motivates a short 
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introduction.12 Three streams of microeconomic theory, mainly focusing on theory of the 
firm, are essential to this thesis.13  
First, neoclassical economic theory in the footsteps of Marshall (1890) and others is 
commonly used when dealing with the economics and rationale of IPRs (see e.g. Granstrand, 
1999, 2010; Scotchmer, 2004; Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2010). When a firm receives a patent 
on a product technology, the society as a whole makes a temporary welfare loss (deadweight 
loss) due to monopolistic pricing above the marginal cost (MC), while the firm can make a 
profit (enabling a positive ROI). This is a sacrifice made from society’s point of view in order 
to create incentives for firms to invest in R&D in the first place. However, since the patent 
protection is temporary the pricing will essentially fall to the MC, leading to increased welfare 
for society at large. Since products are typically based on more than one patented invention, 
and since there might be supplementary products and inventions, reality is of course seldom 
as simple as this economic model. This does not mean that the model is of no use, however. 
The neoclassical theory of the firm builds on an assumption of profit maximization, and that a 
firm should expand its output whenever profitable, i.e. whenever the benefits are greater than 
the costs (see e.g. Frank, 2006). 
Second, transaction cost economics (TCE) of the firm as pioneered by Coase (1937) and 
Williamson (1975, 1985, 1996) is pivotal to the thesis. Contractual relationships are central in 
TCE, making it especially useful when studying IP strategies, but also when studying e.g. 
open innovation. The theory emphasizes the interaction between the cost of organizing 
transactions within an organization and the cost related to transactions on the market (between 
actors) using a price mechanism. Coase argues that a firm is created when the internal 
transaction cost is lower than the transaction cost on the market. The transaction costs on the 
market typically relates to the costs of discovering the relevant price, negotiating, contracting, 
etc. Coase (1937, p. 392) summarizes: 
We may sum up this section of the argument by saying that the operation of a market 
costs something and by forming an organization and allowing some authority (an 
“entrepreneur”) to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are saved. 
Williamson (1975) distinguishes between transactions on the market and within the hierarchy 
(within the organization). Like Coase, Williamson thereby sees markets and firms as 
“alternative instruments for completing a related set of transactions” and further that “whether 
a set of transactions ought to be executed across markets or within a firm depends on the 
relative efficiency of each mode” (Williamson, 1975, p. 8). He includes the concept of 
atmosphere in his transaction cost theory to emphasize the importance of ‘attitudinal 
interactions’ that might occur and that the exchange process in itself thereby might be 
assigned a value. Asset specificity is central in TCE (see e.g. Williamson, 1983, 1985), a 
concept which relates to resources’ values being dependent on a specific transaction. Hence, 
                                                 
 
12 Further advancements will also be made in this area when developing this Licentiate thesis into a PhD thesis. 
13 Notice that macroeconomic theory is also related to this thesis, e.g. the role of technological developments for 
economic growth. 
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asset specificity leads to the parties being tied to the transaction and each other. Another 
important concept in TCE is information impactedness which exists when “true underlying 
circumstances relevant to the transaction, or related set of transactions, are known to one or 
more parties but cannot be costlessly discerned by or displayed for others” (Williamson, 1975, 
p. 31). 
Third, the resource-based theory (RBT) of the firm as put forward by Penrose (1959) 
emphasizes the resources of a firm, and the services rendered by such resources. In a similar 
way as in TCE, RBT distinguishes between the firm and the market in that the “essential 
difference between economic activity inside the firm and economic activity in the ‘market’ is 
that the former is carried on within an administrative organization, while the latter is not” 
(Penrose, 1959, p. 13). Penrose also emphasizes the ambiguous concept of the firm:  
A ‘firm’ is by no means an unambiguous clear-cut entity; it is not an observable object 
physically separable from other objects, and it is difficult to define except with reference 
to what it does or what is done within it. (Penrose, 1959, p. 9) 
A number of strategy scholars have followed in the footsteps of Penrose, developing what is 
commonly called the resource-based view. The works by Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney 
(1991) are central in this stream of literature, and the work of Prahalad and Hamel (1990) on 
core competencies is also important. Barney defines (after some critique from Priem and 
Butler, 2001) resources as “the tangible and intangible assets a firm uses to choose and 
implement its strategies” (2001, p. 54). A competitive advantage is defined to exist when a 
value creating strategy is implemented by a firm without “simultaneously being implemented 
by any current or potential competitors” (Barney, 1991, p. 102). A sustained competitive 
advantage, finally, is a competitive advantage that the current or potential competitors are 
unable to duplicate (Barney, 1991). The competitive implications of a resource can be 
assessed by the VRIO framework, analyzing the resource’s value, rareness, cost to imitate, 
and exploitability by the organization (see e.g. Barney and Hesterly, 2005). Intellectual 
property strategies have major impact on all parts of this framework. Teece et al.’s (1997) 
work on dynamic capabilities (partly building on Nelson and Winter, 1982) should also be 
mentioned here. They emphasize the importance of identifying and embracing new 
opportunities effectively and efficiently rather than focusing on blocking and raising costs for 
competitors and new entrants. 
Most theories of the firm are compatible with each other (Granstrand, 1998), and the 
complementarities between TCE and RBT have been increasingly recognized (see e.g. 
Jacobides and Winter, 2005). As various microeconomic theories see the (complex) world 
from various points of view, it is often beneficiary to employ multiple theories, although with 
care:  
Given the complexity of the phenomena under review, transaction cost economics 
should often be used in addition to, rather than to the exclusion of, alternative 
approaches. Not every approach is equally instructive, however, and they are 
sometimes rival rather than complementary. (Williamson, 1985, p. 18) 
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Both TCE and RBT are useful when studying contractual relations and boundaries of the firm. 
In TCE, various forms of contractual relations are included, emphasizing various degrees of 
integration. Penrose to some extent also discusses this issue: 
The concept of the firm developed above does not depend on the ramification of stock 
ownership or the mere existence of the power to control … On the other hand, long-
term contracts, leases, and patent license agreements may give an equally effective 
control … If a corporation is controlled by … a larger corporation, it is part of the 
larger firm only if there is evidence of an administrative co-ordination of the two 
corporations … Thus, although many industrial firms are more or less loosely bound 
together by a common source of finance or a strong element of common ownership, the 
mere existence of such connections is not of itself sufficient evidence that administrative 
co-ordination is effective and adequate enough to justify calling such a grouping a firm. 
(Penrose, 1959, pp. 18-19) 
The distinction between a firm and a market is thus not clear-cut, and there are various 
degrees of hierarchy, depending on the concentration of responsibility (Williamson, 1985). In 
fact, quasi-integrated forms of organizations have been argued to be most conducive to 
technological innovation and that they will therefore become more common as a result of 
market and organization failures and managerial and technological innovations (Granstrand, 
1982). Technology and technological developments have however not been sufficiently 
accounted for in received theories of the firm, as described by e.g. Granstrand (1998), and 
including them is not easily done, since innovation processes should be viewed as “changes in 
a complete system of not only hardware, but also market environment, production facilities 
and knowledge, and the social contexts of the innovating organization” (Kline and Rosenberg, 
1986, p. 304). 
3.3 Open innovation 
Research on open innovation has been increasing since the work of Chesbrough (2003), 
where the concept of open innovation was coined: “Open Innovation is a paradigm that 
assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and 
external paths to market, as the firms look to advance their technology” (Chesbrough, 2003, p. 
xxiv). Research and practice of open innovation span a much longer time horizon, however 
(Trott and Hartmann, 2009; Bogers et al., 2010; Dahlander and Gann, 2010). See e.g. the 
works of Allen (1977) on gatekeepers, Granstrand (1982) on quasi-integrated organizations 
for technology development, and von Hippel (1988, 2005) on various sources of innovation. 
Granstrand (1982), Granstrand and Sjölander (1990), and Granstrand et al. (1992) present a 
framework of technology procurement/acquisition and exploitation, based on various 
strategies for acquiring and exploiting the technology base of a firm. These are ranked in 
order of the contractual relationships in a TCE inspired way, i.e. in order of the organizational 
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integration as described above, essentially ranging from closed to open ways of acquiring14 
and exploiting15 the technology base. Dahlander and Gann (2010) present a similar generic 
framework, based on previous research, with two dimensions of open innovation, namely (1) 
inbound and outbound, and (2) pecuniary and non-pecuniary. Empirical studies have shown 
that there are complementarities between open and closed forms of innovation (see e.g. 
Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006), especially in that internal R&D increases a firm’s absorptive 
capacity, i.e. the ability to recognize, assimilate and apply external knowledge commercially 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). It has also been shown that inbound openness is related with 
costs, and at some point the search for external ideas renders more costs than benefits 
(Laursen and Salter, 2006) 
Discussing openness implies some form of boundary, and the discussion of the theory and 
boundaries of the firm in section 3.2 and elsewhere thus become essential (see also Paper IV). 
Depending on which level of boundary one refers to, and the degree of openness of that 
boundary, different types and different degrees of openness can be identified. An open, 
collaborative atmosphere between two firms does not necessarily mean that these firms are 
very open in general. If they have a joint venture, which in turn is very closed (in some sense) 
to the outside, the joint venture could in turn be regarded as one closed actor, containing two 
firms with boundaries that are open to a limited part of the external environment. Hence, 
openness is a fairly complex issue where a lot of conceptual and theoretical work remains to 
be done (see Penrose, 1959, for a discussion of what should/could be regarded a firm and not). 
IP issues are central in open innovation, and there are many (interrelated) functions of IPRs 
related to open innovation. In fact, one of the main purposes of an IPR system is to stimulate 
the disclosure and diffusion of new knowledge among various actors, as described in section 
2.2. Patent information is a rich source of technological solutions, and technological 
intelligence (technology scanning), e.g. by studying patent information, could be seen as one 
form of open innovation (see e.g. Granstrand and Sjölander, 1990). IPRs further enable 
technology trade of various forms and IPRs can be used as means for governance of open and 
collaborative innovation. Licensing and technology trade have been extensively studied (see 
e.g. Arora, 1997; Arora et al., 2004; Granstrand, 2004; Lichtenthaler, 2010). Although 
standard-related issues have attracted some interest (see e.g. Swann, 2000; Blind and Thumm, 
2004; Paper IV), few studies of the role of IPRs in governing open innovation more generally 
have so far been undertaken (for an exception, see e.g. Foray and Steinmueller, 2003). 
                                                 
 
14 These include internal R&D (including recruitment and training), acquisition of innovative projects or firms 
(units), joint technology ventures, technology purchasing (contract R&D, licensing in, etc.), and technology 
scanning. See also Granstrand and Sjölander (1990). 
15 These include internal exploitation (direct investments in production and/or marketing of products), creation of 
innovative projects or firms (units), joint ventures, technology selling (performing contract R&D, licensing out, 
etc.), divestment, and storage, dissemination and leakage. See also Granstrand and Sjölander (1990). 
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3.4 Propensity to patent and patent frequency 
There is a difference between patent frequency (number of patents per time unit) and patent 
propensity; the latter being defined as the propensity to patent a patentable invention 
(Mansfield, 1986) or innovation (Arundel and Kabla, 1998). When discussing propensity to 
patent, it is therefore important to distinguish between the patent per R&D cost ratio and the 
propensity to patent a patentable invention or innovation. Between the R&D variable and the 
patent variable is an intermediate variable, namely the number of patentable inventions per 
R&D cost (R&D yield). Somewhat simplified, and without taking uncertainties and time lags 
into account, the relations between different variables can be expressed with the following 
formula: Number of patents = R&D × R&D yield × Patent propensity.  
Early empirical studies by Scherer (1965, 1983) showed that US firms’ patent frequency was 
mainly related to their R&D outlays, and most commonly linearly so in regressions, but with 
varying coefficients over industries. There was in most industries no significant departure 
from constant returns (59.7%), and deviations from constant returns were more commonly 
towards diminishing returns (25.0%) than increasing returns (15.3%). 
Patent propensity varies with industry and firm characteristics. The results of Scherer (1983) 
further showed that the patent per R&D ratio varied over industries, and later results have 
shown that also the patent propensity varies over industries (see e.g. Mansfield, 1986; 
Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999). Firms with R&D collaboration 
agreements have been found to be more likely to patent than others. A conclusion is that  
patents help formalizing R&D collaborations (Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999). 
Further, SMEs have lower propensities to patent than large firms (Mansfield, 1986; Arundel 
and Kabla, 1998; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999; Chabchoub and Niosi, 2005), while they at 
the same time have higher patent per R&D ratios than large firms (Bound et al., 1984; 
Granstrand, 1988). An important fact here is however that innovation activities in SMEs are 
underestimated when measured by R&D statistics while innovation activities in large firms 
are underestimated when measured by patent statistics (Pavitt, 1982). 
The decline and then rise in US patenting in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively, have raised 
interest about patent propensity and patent frequency from researchers. Griliches (1988) 
explained the decrease during the 1970s with business cycle reasons and two oil price shocks. 
Regarding the increase in the 1980s, Kortum and Lerner (1998) found that the rise in 
patenting was driven by changes in R&D management and increases in innovative activities 
with more applied R&D. However, the strengthening of enforcement of patent rights and the 
creation of CAFC, leading to higher propensities to patent, have most commonly been used as 
an explanation behind the increase (see e.g. Granstrand, 1999; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). 
Similarly, the recent rise in Chinese patenting has been explained by strengthened legislation, 
foreign direct investments (FDIs), entry of non-state enterprises with more IPR awareness, 
and increased R&D intensity. For a more thorough review of this literature, see Paper I and 
Paper II. 
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3.5 Appropriation and IP strategies 
The ability to capture returns from R&D investments is commonly denoted appropriability 
(Teece, 1986, Levin et al., 1987). A number of studies have studied the relative effectiveness 
and importance of various means and strategies of protecting the competitiveness of new 
products and processes. Similarly as for patent propensity, the effectiveness of different 
means varies widely over various industries (Levin et al., 1987; Granstrand, 1999). Patents are 
typically more effective for product innovations than for process innovations (Levin et al., 
1987; Granstrand, 1999). Patents have however been shown to be one of the least effective 
means for appropriation in numerous studies (Levin et al., 1987; Harabi, 1995; Kitching and 
Blackburn, 1998; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999; Granstrand, 1999; Cohen et al., 2000; 
Leiponen and Byma, 2009). Instead, firms typically rate informal means of appropriation 
more effective, such as sales or service efforts, market lead times, learning/cost reductions, 
secrecy, and switching costs. The only exception is found among Japanese firms, where 
patents have been rated the most effective means (Granstrand, 1999). The main perceived 
drawbacks with patenting are the possibility for competitors to legally invent around patents 
and the information disclosure related to patenting (Levin et al., 1987; Harabi, 1995), as well 
as the high economic and non-economic costs of patenting (Kicthing and Blackburn, 1998; 
Cohen et al., 2000). Despite these drawbacks and the perceived relative low effectiveness of 
patenting, firms seem to make use of them frequently. In industries where patents were rated 
unimportant, roughly 60% of patentable inventions were still patented (Mansfield, 1986). This 
is sometimes referred to as the patenting paradox. The patent propensity is however higher 
among firms where patents are rated more important for appropriation (Arundel and Kabla, 
1998; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2004). 
In this connection it is important to note that various appropriation means are not mutually 
exclusive, as is, at least implicitly, assumed in some of the abovementioned studies. Patents 
are e.g. one way of increasing market lead time, as is secrecy. In addition, various means are 
complements rather than substitutes. For a further discussion on this stream of literature, see 
Paper I. 
3.6 Motives for patenting 
Previous research on patent propensity and appropriation means indicates that while patents 
are rated with low effectiveness in protecting new products and processes, inventions and 
innovations are frequently patented (see e.g. Mansfield, 1986). This patenting paradox leads 
to the question: Why do firms patent? This question has rendered a number of studies. Despite 
the fact that patents have been shown to have little effectiveness in appropriation, the main 
motive for patenting is undisputedly to protect innovations and thereby prevent imitation 
(Arundel et al., 1995; Duguet and Kabla, 1998; Granstrand, 1999; Cohen et al., 2000; 
Thumm, 2004; Blind et al., 2006; Giuri et al., 2007). Other important motives are to avoid 
trials and to reach a strong position in negotiations (Arundel et al., 1995; Duguet and Kabla, 
1998; Granstrand, 1999) and to block other firms’ R&D and patenting efforts (Cohen et al., 
2000). Additionally, in industries where standards are of importance, e.g. in 
telecommunications, the possibility to reach a strong position in the standard by patenting 
essential inventions is an important motive to patent (Granstrand, 1999; Bekkers et al., 2002).  
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SMEs have been found to, more than large firms, emphasize reputation motives behind 
patenting, i.e. to improve technological image and company value (Blind et al., 2006). In 
addition, SMEs more than large firms patent to license or to convince investors and banks 
about the value of an invention (Granstrand, 1988; Rassefosse, 2011). Other studies have also 
addressed patents’ function as a value signal to investors (Lemley, 2000; Hsu and Ziedonis, 
2008; Haeussler et al., 2009), and SMEs in general are more likely to need venture capital. 
See Paper I for more information on this topic. 
3.7 Value of IPRs and patents 
Some IPRs can be extremely valuable, while most have low or no value. The list of the 
world’s most highly valued trademarks in 2009, and the corresponding values in 2007 and 
2001, is presented in Table 3.1 (see also Interbrand, 2009). Such values must of course be 
treated with care, since they are extremely difficult to measure considering the lack of a 
market to value them. Despite this, they give an indication of the high values of the top 
trademarks. Simultaneously, the world is full of trademarks with extremely low values.  
 
Table 3.1 The world’s most highly valued trademarks 
2009 Rank Trademark 2009 Value (BUSD) 
 2007 Rank 2007 Value (BUSD) 
 2001 Rank 2001 Value (BUSD) 
1 Coca-Cola 68.7 1 65.3 1 68.9 
2 IBM 60.2 3 57.1 3 52.8 
3 Microsoft 56.6 2 58.7 2 65.1 
4 GE 47.8 4 51.6 4 42.4 
5 Nokia 34.9 5 33.7 5 35.0 
6 McDonald’s 32.3 8 29.4 9 25.3 
7 Google 32.0 20 17.8 >100 - 
8 Toyota 31.3 6 32.1 14 18.6 
Source: Interbrand (2009) 
 
Copyrights can also be very valuable. This is exemplified by the massive profits some 
copyright holders can make, but also by the severe decrease in revenue that the music and 
movie industries experienced as more or less legal/illegal internet-based distribution channels 
started to take off in the early 2000s, to various extents infringing on copyrighted material. 
However, most copyrights are again of low or no value.  
Similarly as for other IPRs, patent value distributions are extremely skewed, as reported by 
Lanjouw et al. (1996), Scherer (1999), and Harhoff et al. (2003). In fact, they are so skewed 
that an infinite variance of patent values cannot be ruled out. This means firstly that in such 
cases the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) cannot be unreservedly used when valuing 
patent assets (Granstrand, 2003), and secondly that portfolio strategies do not guarantee that 
average values will reach a stable mean (Scherer, 1999). In general, patents and other IPRs 
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are very difficult to value, even ex post, due to the difficulty in assessing the related cash 
flows.16 
                                                 
 
16 See e.g. Copeland et al. (2005) and Damodaran (2002) for general valuation principles and Mun (2006) for a 
real options approach in valuing patents and other assets. 
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4 Research questions 
The general purpose of the thesis is to explore and explain the causes and consequences of 
intellectual property (IP) strategies and policies at firm, national, and international levels in 
different industrial contexts with different types and degrees of openness in innovation. This 
purpose will be addressed by a number of different research questions that are outlined here, 
based on previous research and observations.  
The literature review indicates a low relative importance of patenting in appropriating returns 
from R&D but a high although varying propensity to patent. Previous studies also indicate 
that there are differences between large firms and SMEs in terms of patent propensity, 
appropriation strategies and motives for patenting. Therefore, the following micro level 
questions are outlined: 
RQ1a: What are the importance and role of patenting for growth in entrepreneurial SMEs? 
RQ1b: What are the motives for and against using patenting among entrepreneurial SMEs? 
Further, previous research has studied both negative and positive growths in US patenting. 
Recent patent statistics (see e.g. Figure 2.2) show that patenting in small countries, including 
Sweden, decreases, a trend that has not yet been explained. Therefore the next research 
question is: 
RQ2: What are the causes and consequences (at both micro and macro level) of positive and 
negative growths of patenting in Sweden? 
The results from studying this question show that large Swedish firms have changed their 
patenting strategies with a more selective and international focus. This leads to the question 
whether firms in other countries increasingly develop similar strategies and behavior. If so, 
and if similar markets are chosen for patent applications, there should be signs of global 
convergence in terms of preferred markets for patenting from firms and inventors in various 
countries (market convergence). If there is a convergence of preferred markets, a related 
question is whether there is also a convergence of the set of prioritized technologies 
(technology convergence17) in various countries, or whether technological specialization still 
dominates.18 Related to this is the question whether various nations’ legal IPR systems (macro 
level policies) become increasingly similar (legal convergence). This leads to the following 
set of research questions: 
RQ3a: Is there market convergence?  
RQ3b: Is there technology convergence? 
                                                 
 
17 Notice that technology convergence is distinguished from technological convergence, as studied by e.g. 
Rosenberg (1963); technological convergence then meaning that two or more technologies are increasingly 
jointly developed or combined. See Paper III for more details. 
18 For studies of technological specialization, see Soete (1981, 1987), Patel and Pavitt (1987, 1991), Cantwell 
(1989, 1991), Dosi et al. (1990), Archibugi and Pianta (1992, 1994), Gambardella and Torrisi (1998), and 
Cantwell and Vertova (2004). 
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RQ3c: Is there IPR legal convergence?  
A related question, to some extent addressed in Paper III, is whether there is a convergence of 
international management practices. An example of an increasingly important phenomenon 
worldwide is the management of innovation in an open and collaborative way over firm 
boundaries. Despite the fact that IP strategies are crucial in open innovation, little research has 
yet been performed on the interrelation between IP strategies and open innovation. The final 
research question is therefore: 
RQ4: How are IP strategies impacting openness in innovation and vice versa? 
These research questions are part of a broader context, with subsequent research leading on to 
the final PhD thesis. The general purpose will therefore not be entirely and ultimately 
scrutinized in this licentiate thesis. The appended papers are numbered in accordance with the 
related research questions. Paper I focuses on RQ1a-b, Paper II focuses on RQ2, Paper III 
focuses on RQ3a-c, and Paper IV focuses on RQ4.     
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5 Methodology 
The methods applied are described in detail in the appended papers. A short overview of the 
overall methodology and the basic assumptions employed is however given here. The chapter 
also includes some contextual background to the conducted research. 
5.1 Research projects 
The research underlying this thesis has been performed in two projects; Patents and 
Innovations for Growth and Welfare19 (financed by the Swedish government) and 
Management, Economics and IP Law of Open Distributed Innovation Processes (financed by 
Vinnova). Both projects have been conducted within the Industrial Management and 
Economics research group at Department of Technology Management and Economics at 
Chalmers University of Technology. 
While the first research project is more policy and macro level oriented, the second is more 
management and micro level oriented. However, large overlaps and interactions between the 
micro and macro levels have been found, as described and argued for in this thesis, and the 
two projects have therefore turned out to have major synergies, especially regarding the 
relation between micro and macro levels. 
The nature of IP issues requires an interdisciplinary approach when studying them, which has 
been addressed in both of the abovementioned research projects. More specifically, the need 
for taking managerial, economical, legal, and technological (MELT) factors into account have 
been identified in the projects, and the research teams have thus been designed to include such 
skills.20 Being educated in management, economics, and engineering, those perspectives are 
the main ones in this thesis. This has been complemented by input from other scholars within 
and outside the research teams, especially regarding legal issues. 
5.2 Basic assumptions and research strategy 
Before describing the research methods used, it is of importance to describe the point of 
departure of the study in terms of epistemological and ontological assumptions, since these 
naturally guide the choice of methods. The basic assumptions of this thesis can probably most 
closely be described as critical realism (see Bhaskar, 1989). In critical realism, social 
phenomena are assumed to be “produced by mechanisms that are real, but that are not directly 
accessible to observation and are discernible only through their effects” (Bryman and Bell, 
2007, p. 628).21 Hence, in terms of ontology (the nature of existence), the critical realist 
approach accepts neither pure objectivism nor pure constructionism. Regarding epistemology 
(the nature of knowledge), critical realism implies two things: 
                                                 
 
19 See SOU (2006). 
20 Other disciplines, such as sociology, behavioral science, political science, and history (technological, 
economical, and general) are also of importance. 
21 For a description of social structures and social mechanisms, see e.g. Bhaskar (1989) or Smith (1998). 
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First, it implies that, whereas positivists take the view that the scientist’s 
conceptualization of reality actually directly reflects that reality, realists argue that the 
scientist’s conceptualization is simply a way of knowing that reality … Secondly, by 
implication, critical realists unlike positivists are perfectly content to admit into their 
explanations theoretical terms that are not directly amenable to observation. As a 
result, hypothetical entities to account for regularities in the natural or social orders 
(the ‘generative mechanisms’ to which Bhaskar refers) are perfectly admissible for 
realists, but not for positivists. (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 18)  
Critical realism has been argued to constitute more accurate assumptions than the prevailing 
positivist approach when studying the interplay between micro and macro levels in 
economics, as argued by e.g. Lawson (1997, 2003). This has come as a reaction to the 
mathematical modeling and pure deductive approach otherwise commonly used in 
mainstream economics: 
It seems to be the case, however, that the ontological presuppositions of the methods of 
mathematical modeling used by economists are rarely questioned or even 
acknowledged, at least not in any systematic or sustained way. As a result, the 
possibility of a lack of ontological fit … is not considered … And my assessment, simply 
stated … is that these preconditions of mathematical-deductivist methods appear not to 
arise very often in the social realm. (Lawson, 2003, p. 12)  
The critique of mainstream economics above does however not mean that mathematical 
methods and models, and the related clarity, rigor and consistency, should be abandoned, but 
they should be complemented with other methods.  As Lawson (2003, p. 21) puts it: “I do 
though insist that these attributes are not enough, that ability to illuminate the social realm 
counts as well.” 
Drawing upon the arguments above, both inductive and deductive research strategies are used 
in the research underlying this thesis. These are seldom pure forms of methodologies, since 
deductive studies typically include an element of induction and vice versa. The combination 
of induction and deduction means that this study can be categorized as an iterative study in 
which data and theory are simultaneously (or iteratively) developed and analyzed (Bryman 
and Bell, 2007). Also drawing upon the arguments above, both qualitative and quantitative 
research methods are iteratively used. This is further discussed below. 
5.3 Research methods and data sources 
The IPR field is an area where a lot of quantitative data sources are available. These are very 
useful, but sole reliance upon these data sources would probably not give as valuable and 
interesting results as if complementing with other data sources. In fact, numerous authors 
have advocated the use of multiple methods, commonly denoted triangulation22, in order to 
increase validity (Jick, 1979; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Flick, 2009). Multiple methods can 
                                                 
 
22 Notice that the exact definition of triangulation varies slightly in various literatures on research methods. 
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however do more than only increase validity, especially when combining quantitative and 
qualitative methods: 
That is, beyond the analysis of overlapping variance, the use of multiple measures may 
also uncover some unique variance which otherwise may have been neglected by single 
methods. It is here that qualitative methods, in particular, can play an especially 
prominent role by eliciting data and suggesting conclusions to which other methods 
would be blind. Elements of the context are illuminated. In this sense, triangulation may 
be used not only to examine the same phenomenon from multiple perspectives but also 
to enrich our understanding by allowing for new or deeper dimensions to emerge. (Jick, 
1979, pp. 603-604) 
This study has therefore employed various data collection methods, including interviews, 
questionnaires surveys, public statistics, and document studies, in a complementary way. 
These methods are described more in depth in the various papers, and they are summarized in 
Table 5.1. Besides the data sources specifically described in the papers, a number of 
interviews framing the research in an industrial and international context have been 
undertaken. The reason for this has essentially been to further increase the number of 
perspectives and to enrich the understanding of the subject, as argued by Jick (1979). The 
most important of those ‘contextualizing’ interviews are presented in Table 5.2. In addition, 
meetings with practitioners and scholars at various conferences have also provided important 
input to the study. 
 
Table 5.1 Data collection methods in the different papers 
 Public statistics Questionnaires Interviews Document studies1) 
Paper I  X X  
Paper II X X2) X3)  
Paper III X  X X 
Paper IV X  X X 
Notes: 1) This category emphasizes the use of document studies for empirical data collection. Notice that all 
 studies contain some form of document study when designing and framing the study based on previous 
 research. 
 2) The author of this thesis did not take part in the questionnaire and sample design. 
 3) The author of this thesis did not take part in the interviews.  
 
Paper I presents a literature review and empirical material collected in interviews in three 
samples of entrepreneurial SMEs. The concept of entrepreneurial firms is in this case used on 
one hand to denote firms based on new technologies and on the other hand firms with new or 
improved commercialization.23 In addition to the interviews, a small questionnaire was used 
to collect additional information on patents. The primary data source in Paper I is however 26 
                                                 
 
23 See Gartner (1990) for a discussion on the concept of entrepreneurship. 
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semi-structured interviews. Non-probability sampling was used when selecting the firms, 
focusing on the tail of firms in various variables. The first interview sample consisted of eight 
firms with high sales growth, the second sample consisted of twelve hi-tech firms, and the 
third sample consisted of six firms in a Swedish region, ‘Gnosjöregionen’, recognized for its 
entrepreneurial spirit (Wigren, 2003). See Paper I for more details. 
Paper II is based primarily on patent statistics and questionnaire surveys, but to some extent 
also on interviews. The sources for patent statistics were primarily the Swedish PTO, USPTO, 
and WIPO. A questionnaire survey was performed among three samples of firms; large 
patentees, SMEs, and patent consultancy firms. Again, tail sampling was found most suitable. 
On one hand, the use of tail sampling could limit the generalizability of the results, but on the 
other hand there is a large benefit in the fact that the results then do actually explain a major 
part of the fluctuations on national level (cf. RQ2). Thus, in this case tail sampling is expected 
to increase the validity of the explanatory factors behind the fluctuations. The large patentees 
were essentially sampled among the largest Swedish firms with the highest patenting 
frequency, in order to explain as much of patenting fluctuations on national level as possible. 
38 out of 73 firms responded (52%). The sample of SMEs focused on smaller patentees with a 
decrease in patent frequency. 20 out of 51 firms responded (39%). The final sample consisted 
of the largest patent consultancy firms in Sweden. The 12 out of 14 responding firms (86%) 
jointly corresponded to about 83% of the total sales of the patent consultancy industry in 
Sweden.24 
Paper III is mainly based on public statistics, but also to some degree on interviews (including 
some of the ones in Table 5.2) and documents. The statistics were collected from WIPO and 
USPTO. Paper III focuses on global convergence, and convergence is then defined as a 
decrease in difference. Three difference indices, based on patent statistics, were constructed 
for market convergence and technology convergence, respectively, i.e. six difference indices 
in total.25 All pairs of countries were compared in terms of patent market shares and 
technology shares, and related measures, essentially resulting in ே
మ
ଶ െ ܰ  unique difference 
indices, for each type of index, with ܰ number of countries (although missing data for some 
countries led to fewer unique indices in practice). Convergence was then measured as a 
decrease in difference indices. See Paper III for a more elaborate description of index 
constructions and statistical tests. 
Paper IV, finally, includes a longitudinal case study of technology development in mobile 
telecommunications, and it is based on interviews, document studies and patent statistics. The 
work with Paper IV is still in progress, and a number of interviews remain to be conducted to 
                                                 
 
24 Notice that due to lack of data the sampling of large patentees and SMEs had to be done in a sequence of steps. 
See Paper II for more information. Also notice that the author of this thesis did not take part in the questionnaire 
and sample design for Paper II. 
25 These indices are partly based on the work of Balassa (1965) on revealed comparative advantage. Technology 
convergence further relates to the works on technological specialization by Soete (1981, 1987), Patel and Pavitt 
(1987, 1991), and others. 
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update the case material. Paper IV partly rests on quantitative data on essential patents in the 
different telecommunication standards (1G, 2G, 3G, and 4G), reported to the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). The patent data is partly used to measure 
how concentrated among actors the technological development is in various generations of 
standards. However, since the essential patents are self-reported to ETSI, and since extensive 
over-reporting is likely due to the importance of holding a strong patent position in standard 
setting and licensing agreements, the reported essential patents need to be evaluated before 
treating them as essential patents to ensure measurement validity. Such evaluations have been 
made in various studies, among only a few are publicly available. The results from the studies 
conducted by Fairfield Resources International (2005, 2007, 2009a, 2009b) are used in this 
study. 
 
Table 5.2 List of the most important contextualizing interviews 
Company/organization Country Interviewee(s) 
E.ON Sweden Head of Innovation and Environment 
R&D Coordinator 
Ericsson Sweden Vice President of Patent Strategies and 
Portfolio Management 
EU-China IPR2 China Team Leader 
Huawei China IP Deputy Director 
IBM UK IP Law Counsel 
IBM Japan Senior Counsel, IP Law 
Japan Intellectual Property Association Japan Executive Managing Director 
Japan Management of Technology Association Japan Senior Executive Director 
Secretary General 
Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO) Korea Director, International Cooperation Division 
Ministry of Science and Technology China Director 
NanoCarrier Japan Senior Advisor 
Nokia UK Director of IPR, Regulatory Affairs 
State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) China Hearing 
Tokyo Small and Medium Business Investment & 
Consultation 
Japan President and CEO (Former director of IP 
Strategy Headquarters in Japan) 
Volvo Group Sweden President and CEO 
Volvo Technology Transfer Sweden CEO 
 
Patent statistics provide a reliable source of information about the number of patent 
applications in different countries, by different firms, in different patent classes, etc., and have 
therefore partly been used in the research behind this thesis. Using patent statistics also 
ensures a high degree of replicability in the studies. Patents are however commonly used to 
measure the inventive productivity of firms and nations. The results of this study contain a 
Licentiate Thesis, M. Holgersson, 2011 
32 
number of reasons to question the construct validity of this measure (measurement validity). 
There is indeed a relation between invention production and the number of patents, but due to 
differences in patenting strategies over nations, industries, firms, and time, this relation is not 
easy to assess. Any results obtained from patent data must therefore be analyzed with care. 
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6 Summaries of appended papers 
This chapter presents the summaries of the appended papers. These summaries leave little 
room for methodological, theoretical, and empirical details. Therefore, readers are referred to 
the appended papers for more information. 
6.1 Paper I 
Patent propensity, appropriation and motives for patenting innovations: A literature 
review and an empirical study of entrepreneurial SMEs 
This paper starts with reviewing previous research on patent propensity, appropriation and 
motives for patenting innovations. Research on these issues has mainly focused on large firms 
and there is a need for research on SMEs, which differ from large firms according to earlier 
studies. To this end 26 interviews were performed among three samples of entrepreneurial 
SMEs in Sweden (high/top growth SMEs, hi-tech SMEs, and SMEs within a highly 
entrepreneurial region), to explore the importance and role of patenting, and the motives for 
and against using patents. The patent knowledge was low among the studied SMEs, and 
internal patent competence was found to be a prerequisite for effective and efficient use of the 
patent system, indicating that there is a critical size and/or profitability at which SMEs can 
afford to acquire the competencies necessary to benefit from the patent system. A low 
importance of patents for deterring imitation relates to limited resources within SMEs for 
monitoring and enforcing their rights. It is found that various motives for patenting impact 
patent propensity and that different appropriation means are complements rather than 
supplements. While of limited perceived importance for protecting inventions, patents were 
instead used to attract customers and investors. Patents can function as a governance 
mechanism for investors and financiers, and patents have both venture capital qualifying and 
winning characteristics. 
6.2 Paper II 
The anatomy of rise and fall of patenting and propensity to patent: The case of Sweden 
Fluctuations in patenting frequency and propensity to patent have caught increasing interest 
since the productivity and patenting slowdown in the US in the 1970s and then especially 
since the US switch to a stronger IP regime in the 1980s, triggering the emergence of a 
worldwide pro-patent era. In this paper fluctuations in Swedish patent frequency from 1990 to 
2006 are described and analyzed, based on statistics, questionnaire survey studies among 
large and small patentees as well as IP consultancy firms, and an interview-based case. The 
results confirm previous research about the importance of size of R&D and size of patenting 
resources for both large and small firms across industries and for both positive and negative 
growth of patenting, as well as the importance of business cycles. In addition, a more quality-
oriented approach in patenting with more selective patenting led to decreased patenting 
frequency (especially among large firms), while a decreased importance of patents for 
financing R&D, related to a decline in the supply of venture capital following the business 
downturn in the early 2000s, led to decreased patenting frequency among small patentees. As 
to propensity to patent using different routes, national first filings are declining in the longer 
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run on average for small countries like Sweden and Finland, as especially large companies 
internationalize their IP operations and increasingly use the PCT route. This trend has serious 
implications for national patent policies and patent offices in small countries. 
6.3 Paper III 
Managing multinational technology and intellectual property (IP) – Is there global 
convergence? 
This paper addresses various hypotheses about global convergence – economic, management, 
market, technology and legal convergence – by analyzing international patenting and 
intellectual property (IP) conditions. The empirical base is worldwide patent statistics and 
interviews in Asia, Europe and US. A mixed picture of convergence emerges with signs of 
market and IP legal convergence, partial economic and technology convergence, and 
anecdotal evidence of technology and IP management convergence. Asian NICs have 
significantly increased their international patenting and supply of patented inventions, and 
strengthened their IP regimes. Switching from weak to strong IP regimes in the technological 
catch-up process has traditionally attracted inward FDIs, technology transfer and R&D. 
However, recent IP developments, especially in China, may imply strong but protectionist IP 
regimes that could reverse this behavior among MNCs in other countries. Such policy 
changes will have profound impact on R&D, technology and innovation management in 
developed as well as developing countries. 
6.4 Paper IV 
The dynamics of multi-layered openness in innovation systems: The role of distributed 
knowledge and intellectual property 
This paper aims at clarifying some underpinnings of open innovation by exploring the 
dynamics of openness of innovation and intellectual property (IP) at different levels of 
organizational boundaries using the case of a series of overlapping generations of mobile 
communications standards.  
The empirical analysis shows how companies in a network (or community) pool their 
technologies in a collaborative development of new generations of mobile communication 
standards. Initially fairly discrete generational shifts have become more incremental and 
frequent due to increasing technological overlaps, leading to a more continuous dynamics 
with an increasing amount of transitional sub-generations (gap-fillers or turbo versions), such 
as GPRS (2.5G) and HSPA (3.5G and 3.75G). At the same time the number of technologies 
and the number of intellectual property right (IPR) holders have increased. 
The continued analysis extracts two main dimensions of innovation openness, namely 
organizational openness and IPR openness, related to the knowledge distribution and 
knowledge accessibility within the innovation system, respectively. These dimensions 
represent different but related conceptualizations of open innovation. The case shows that 
organizational openness in general does not imply IPR openness, or vice versa. Moreover, the 
cross-correlation between these two distinct dimensions changes in size and sign over time. 
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Thus, IPR openness and weak IP regimes do not necessarily promote organizational openness 
and innovation performance. 
The paper concludes that in managing innovation, there is a need to consider different types 
and levels of openness in order to create and sustain an efficient innovation system, i.e. 
openness in innovation systems is multi-layered and multi-dimensional, and in addition 
dynamic. Thus, any notion of the existence of a stable level of optimal openness in innovation 
is overly simplistic and likely to mislead managerial and policy decisions. In particular, firms 
need to dynamically manage their cross-boundary activities with more skillful IP 
management. 
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7 Main results 
This chapter will answer the research questions outlined in chapter 4, based on the results in 
the various papers (see also chapter 6). This chapter focuses on the results specifically related 
to the research questions, and the reader is therefore referred to the appended papers for 
further results and more elaborate descriptions and discussions of the results. The first set of 
research questions were generated from identified differences between large firms and SMEs 
in terms of patent propensity, appropriation strategies, and motives for patenting. The 
following research questions were developed: 
RQ1a: What are the importance and role of patenting for growth in entrepreneurial SMEs? 
RQ1b: What are the motives for and against using patenting among entrepreneurial SMEs? 
The results of Paper I indicate that patents were of little perceived importance for 
appropriating returns from R&D in the studied entrepreneurial SMEs, and the studied firms 
had low trust in general for patents’ ability to deter imitation. This was essentially due to 
SMEs having limited resources for monitoring and enforcing their patent rights. Other reasons 
were the information disclosure related to patent protection and the possibility for competitors 
to legally invent around the patent protection (these reasons have previously been addressed 
by e.g. Levin et al., 1987, and Harabi, 1995). In fact, when patenting, the motive among the 
studied SMEs was not mainly to deter imitation (contrasting the results of a number of 
previous studies, see e.g. Arundel et al., 1995; Duguet and Kabla, 1998; Granstrand, 1999; 
Cohen et al., 2000; Thumm, 2004; Blind et al., 2006). Instead, patents were mainly used for 
attracting customers and capital (both of which in fact have large impact on firm growth), 
again contrasting previous results (see e.g. Thumm, 2004). This should be analyzed in light of 
the fact that many of the studied firms, at least the entrepreneurial hi-tech SMEs, were young, 
and securing financing is a crucial activity in young hi-tech firms. Thus, it is possible, and 
likely, that the role of and motive for patenting changes as these firms mature. The fact that 
investors seem to require patents before making venture capital (VC) investments is 
interesting, and it is in Paper I argued that patents provide a governance mechanism in VC 
financing that complements e.g. employment contracts. 
The next research question to be answered was a result of a recent decrease in patenting in 
Sweden at the national level. Therefore the following research question was formulated: 
RQ2: What are the causes and consequences (at both micro and macro level) of positive and 
negative growths of patenting in Sweden? 
The results of Paper II show that changes in R&D and patenting resources impact patenting 
frequency, and so does business cycles, confirming previous results by e.g. Scherer (1983) 
and Griliches (1988). In addition, a rise in the importance of patents during the 1990s led to 
increased patenting, while the decrease in national patenting during the early 2000s was 
explained by more selective and more quality-oriented patenting, especially among large 
firms. SMEs on the other hand rated a decreased importance of patents for financing R&D 
highly as a factor behind a decrease in patenting (cf. Paper I). The latter is related to a decline 
in the supply of VC in general in Sweden after the business downturn around year 2000. 
Further, a decrease in national patenting in Sweden is partly explained by an increased use of 
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international routes to apply for patents, especially the use of the PCT system. This has 
implications for the Swedish PTO, as well as for PTOs in other small countries where a 
similar internationalization of the domestic firms’ IP behavior is taking place, in turn 
decreasing the importance of the national patent application route. It also has implications for 
the patent consultancy industries in these countries, since they are typically oriented towards 
the national patent offices regarding language preferences etc. 
The increasing internationalization described above, and the general globalization, leads to the 
question whether firms worldwide increasingly develop similar strategies and behavior. The 
third set of research questions were thus developed around the theme of convergence; whether 
preferred output markets for patenting from firms and inventors in various countries become 
increasingly similar (market convergence), whether the set of prioritized technologies in 
various countries become increasingly similar (technology convergence), and finally whether 
various nations’ legal IPR systems (macro level policies) become increasingly similar (legal 
convergence): 
RQ3a: Is there market convergence?  
RQ3b: Is there technology convergence? 
RQ3c: Is there IPR legal convergence?  
The results of Paper III indicate that there is a market convergence; all three difference indices 
used in the paper show statistically significant decreases over time. There is not as clear 
results regarding technology convergence, however, since the changes of the different indices 
are not consistent in sign. The varying results regarding technology convergence could be 
explained by similar technological fields becoming increasingly important in various 
countries, but at the same time that the differences in relative technological specialization26 in 
the various fields are increasing. Previous studies have in general indicated increasing 
national specialization, and the specialization-related measures in this study also indicate 
increasing differences between nations, which is an indication of increasing technological 
specialization in line with the results by e.g. Cantwell and Vertova (2004). It should also be 
noted that market convergence and technology convergence could be negatively correlated if 
globalization leads to a general convergence of consumer needs (cf. Paper III for details). 
An IPR legal convergence is identified, especially regarding patent law, partly driven by the 
TRIPS agreement and its enforcement through the WTO. This has in general led to a 
strengthening of otherwise commonly weak IP regimes in developing countries. Developing 
countries then typically switch from a weak to a strong IP regime at a point in time when the 
mainly innovative benefits from a strong regime outweigh the mainly imitative benefits of a 
weak regime. It should be noted, however, that the industrial sectors in developing countries 
                                                 
 
26 A nation is specialized in a technological area if the share of their total number of patents that belongs to that 
area is larger than the share out of all nations’ patents that belongs to the area. See also Soete (1981, 1987), Patel 
and Pavitt (1987, 1991), Cantwell (1989, 1991), Dosi et al. (1990), Archibugi and Pianta (1992, 1994), 
Gambardella and Torrisi (1998), and Cantwell and Vertova (2004). 
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are typically at various development stages, with both leading and lagging sectors, and the 
optimal timing of a switch is therefore difficult to assess.     
The final research question is developed based on an increasing interest for and use of various 
forms of open innovation. This is intriguing from an IP perspective, since open innovation 
puts increasing demand on proper and new forms of IP management and IP strategies. Many 
relevant questions in this field remain to be answered, and the final research question in this 
thesis was: 
RQ4: How are IP strategies impacting openness in innovation and vice versa? 
Paper IV is based on a case of four generations of mobile communications systems. The 
preliminary results show that open and collaborative innovation can be organized in 
innovation systems with both open/lax and closed/strong internal IP regimes. However, an 
open regime is not stable if one or more actors choose to change strategies to more aggressive 
ones. This was essentially what happened during the second generation of mobile 
communications, and the number of reported essential patents for the different generations of 
mobile communications has increased steeply since then. The case also indicates that there is 
innovation openness of different types and on different levels, each with different degrees of 
openness. IPRs and various related contracts (including licensing contracts) can be used for 
governance of the different types, levels, and degrees of openness. Paper IV particularly 
argues that firms need to manage cross-boundary activities in a dynamic way, where skillful 
IP management is of pivotal importance. 
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8 Conclusions 
The general purpose of this thesis has been to explore and explain the causes and 
consequences of intellectual property (IP) strategies and policies at firm, national, and 
international levels in different industrial contexts with different types and degrees of 
openness in innovation. Besides the answers to the specific research questions given in 
chapter 7, the results of this thesis all in all indicate a dynamic interplay between IP strategies 
and policies at different micro and macro levels. More specifically, the thesis has shown that 
due to policy developments at macro level, including the emergence of the pro-patent era, 
large firms developed their IP strategies and especially their patent strategies. Initially, the 
patenting increased as a result of rising value and strategic importance of patents. 
Subsequently, large firms started to focus more on selective and quality-oriented patenting, 
leading to a slowdown of national patenting, in turn impacting national policies. As 
globalization continues and firms become increasingly internationalized, there is a 
convergence of preferred national output markets for patent applications, again impacting 
macro level developments, and especially national patent offices in small countries. Further, 
national legal IPR systems converge towards a strong IP regime, partly as a result of pressure 
on developing and newly industrialized countries (NICs) from developed countries27 (and 
their major firms) and partly as a result from innovative benefits from strong regimes 
outweighing the benefits from weak ones. This impacts the IP strategies of firms in NICs, e.g. 
in China, and their leading multinational corporations (MNCs) seem to quickly adjust and 
become frequent patentees internationally, in turn creating reactions from competing firms in 
developed countries. In corporate innovation systems with various types and degrees of 
openness, a change to an aggressive IP strategy from one actor typically leads to reactions in 
form of aggressive strategies also from other actors. Such a change is then difficult to rewind, 
especially in cases of cumulative and complex technologies. This does not necessarily lead to 
a closed innovation system, but rather that new forms of governance of open innovation is 
necessary (including various licensing schemes28) in turn leading to a different type of 
openness. It is still an open question how transaction costs are affected by such a change, but 
it does put new demands on IP valuation and pricing skills, as fair (in some sense) licensing 
deals need to be outlined. 
This thesis has made a number of empirical contributions; describing the role of and motive 
for patenting in SMEs (Paper I), explaining fluctuations in Swedish patenting (Paper II), 
showing signs of various forms of global convergence (Paper III), and describing the 
longitudinal development of mobile communications standards and the role of IP (Paper IV). 
Methodologically, the development of market and technology difference indices in Paper III 
and the related matrices of two by two country comparisons is probably the most important 
contribution. The main theoretical contribution of the thesis is outlined in Paper IV (and is 
                                                 
 
27 In this context the debate about the patent protection of pharmaceuticals in third world countries deserves to be 
mentioned, see e.g. Scherer (2004). 
28 See e.g. Bogers et al. (2011) for descriptions of various generic types of licenses. 
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thus still work in progress), and relates to the concept of innovation openness, and various 
degrees, types, and levels of openness. This is closely related to various theories of the firm, 
and more specifically to the boundaries of firms. 
Future studies are suggested to further elaborate upon the concept of open innovation. In the 
light of presumed benefits of opening up firms’ innovation processes, it is also of interest to 
investigate theoretical predictions of such benefits.29 Additional research on the relation 
between IP issues and open innovation is also needed. In this connection, IP valuation and 
pricing issues need to be addressed as well as the role of IP in governance of financing and of 
technological collaborations. Future studies using patent statistics should consider the fact that 
patent propensity varies over time due to changes in patent strategies, and it is most likely that 
patent and IP strategies will continue to develop as industries are becoming increasingly 
knowledge- and IP-based. After all, “future competition in the world is IP competition” 
(Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, 2004, as cited in SOU, 2006, p. 101).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
29 One such prediction could be based on Penrose’s (1959) argument of using excess resources at zero marginal 
cost, but in this case more specifically using excess technological resources externally. 
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